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Israel at the crossing point
June 5, 2001

Thirty-four years ago, on June 5th, 1967, Israel launched the lightning strikes that began what came to be called the Six Day War. The attacks followed weeks of escalating provocations by Palestinian guerillas and neighboring Arab states. Explicit threats to eliminate the Jewish State came from Arab capitals. Israel was under blockade by the Egyptians, isolated diplomatically, and constrained by an international arms embargo. Urgent international mediation efforts proved unsuccessful. The situation was grim.

Today Israel's strategic and diplomatic position is better, but the urgency of the hour is no less serious. The unilateral ceasefire imposed by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and the government's restraint in the face of terrorist provocations is frayed to the breaking point. The airwaves are filled with funerals of teenage terror victims. Talk shows are filled with discussions of the coming war, and the question asked is not "if" but "when" and "how."

If there is any consolation in this critical time, it is the growing sense of unity among Israeli Jews, a closing of ranks. There is widespread condemnation of Yasser Arafat and his Authority, now officially branded as a supporter and organizer of terrorism. Even long-time advocates of the Oslo Process are admitting that they were mistaken in assuming that Palestinian long-term intentions were aimed at coexistence with Israel. Still, these observations are purely academic at this point. The question Israelis are asking is: how do we get out of this mess? Where do we go from here?

There is broad support for the initial steps taken by the government in the last two weeks. This includes the unilateral ceasefire, and the series of steps authorized in the wake of Friday night's attack in Tel Aviv that killed twenty young people. It is not easy to restrain the human urge to strike back after such a terrible act, but there is a broad recognition that, as the saying goes, "revenge is best eaten cold." With the Palestinian Authority and the terrorist organizations under its umbrella on high alert, there are fewer "live" targets to attack. There is a sense, for the time being at least, that the international community is more aware than ever about what we are up against. The face of Palestinian duplicity has been laid bare for all to see. That advantage, of course, will prove very ephemeral, but it is obviously critical to have greater American and European understanding, if not backing, for our motivations and good-faith efforts to avoid all-out confrontation.

Still, the value of restraint is not just for PR. It can be understood, as Sharon would have it, as a sign of strength: cool-headed calculations prevailing over hot-hearted emotions. (Whether our Arab adversaries perceive it this way is more doubtful: the Mideast is not known to be governed by reason). This "internal fortitude," however, is critical to unify the nation. But the question remains: unify for what? what would we be fighting for?

Israel today finds itself at a crossing point: in hindsight, the seven years of Oslo brought us only a false messiah of "peace now," unreciprocated concessions accompanied by escalating terror. With more than one hundred dead since Arafat rejected the Barak and Clinton proposals and opted for violence, Israelis realize that our adversaries uniformly seek to realize, in stages if not in one blow, the dismemberment, demoralization, and ultimately, the dissolution of the "Zionist entity." If there is still to be a two-state solution, Israelis have been disabused of the notion of the Benelux-like borderless intermingling once envisioned. Future coexistence can be built only on a hard-headed policy of deterrence and the principle that good fences make good neighbors.

The first task, then, is to build the fences. The call for unilateral separation was first uttered by Rabin, then Barak: "Us here, Them there."

The stumbling block always has been where is here and where is there. The Israeli right has never countenanced a border that would recognize the pre-1967 "Green Line" and put the settlements on the other side. Already, the settlers feel dangerously exposed and abandoned. Here, too, the Barak precedent-in which 20% of the settlements containing 80% of the settlers were to be annexed-may point a way to a consensus approach. These areas-especially around Jerusalem, Gush Etzion, and the "seam" separating Israel's narrow coastal waistline-are the logical candidates for implementing a policy of unilateral separation. It is no surprise that the Netanya bomber came from the border town of Tulkarm and the Tel-Aviv bomber came from the border town of Kalkilya. The Jerusalem area is even more complicated, but here too a security belt can isolate the city to a large extent from the surrounding Palestinian areas.

These separation areas should be considered provisional "security zones" erected for protective reasons. To the extent possible, they would include Jewish residents and exclude Palestinians residents. They would help close the porous seam that has permitted easy infiltration by terrorists, even if the seal would not be hermetic. Creation of the zones would require no controversial and divisive legislation. They would enjoy broad Israeli support because of the additional protection they would afford. If dislocation of Palestinian residents was kept to a minimum and no additional Jewish settlements were established, even the Americans and Europeans may express a modicum of understanding for the steps. And the sense of "creeping annexation," however unofficial, would provide a powerful incentive for Palestinians terrorists and their backers to refrain from attacks within or without these zones, lest such attacks be used to justify expansion of the zones.

Creation of effective security zones will take a great deal of time and money. Under previous governments, the task was politically impossible and practically unfeasible. Now security zones are understood to be imperative. In the "fog of war," facts on the ground can be created that will be irreversible later. If these facts fall within the Israeli consensus enunciated by Rabin and mapped by Barak, they are likely to endure with or without formal agreements with the Palestinians. Isolated settlements may need at some point to be relocated to defensible blocs in locations that serve Israel's security interests. Palestinians residents inside the security zones may need to be relocated elsewhere.

Israel urgently must restore a sense of deterrence that has dangerously eroded in recent years. The deterrent force will be found not only in retaliation to provocation but in creative strategies that change the realities on the ground even as they maintain consensus support for sustainable policies. Here, at this strategic crossing point, the Israeli answer to Palestinian terrorism must be to close crossing points, build fences, and implement a "good neighbor" policy of unilateral separation along lines we can, literally, live with.